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Abstract
This Article unfolds as follows: Section I looks at the “pervasive effect” of European Union
(”EU”) law upon the substantive law of the Member States. Instead of attempting to cover all cases
where this effect has arisen, a selective but in-depth approach is preferred. In this regard, four areas
falling within the competences of the Member States will be discussed, namely education, family
law, direct taxation, and health care. Section II is devoted to the pervasive effects of EU law upon
national rules of procedure. Taking four cases as examples, this Section sets out to demonstrate
that the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”) takes into account the general procedural principles
enshrined in national law when applying the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Finally,
Section III provides a brief conclusion on the link between substantive EU law and national laws
of Member States.

ARTICLES
FEDERALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE
Koen Lenaerts
“I do not think [the case law shows] that the Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction or has adopted a federalist approach contrary to the
provisions of the Treaty itself. It seems to me that the Court has
sought to do what the Treaty required it to do. I certainly never saw
myself as one of a unanimous group of committed federalists
conspiring to push federation beyond the limits laid down by the
Treaty. If we had been such, a great deal of the hard-headed
discussion in thrashing out judgments within the framework of the
Treaty could have been avoided. Instead we sought to decide in
accordance with the Treaty and the object and purpose of the
legislation.”
—Lord Slynn of Hadley1

INTRODUCTION
This Article honors the late Lord Slynn in that it confirms
the above statement through an examination of federalism and
the rule of law in the work of the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ” or “Court”). A classical approach might suggest
examining the role that the Court has had in monitoring the
legislative competences of the European Union (“EU”), or in
setting a common standard of protection of fundamental rights2
* Judge and President of Chamber at the Court of Justice of the European Union,
and Professor of European Union Law K.U. Leuven, he holds a lic. iuris, PhD in Law
(K.U. Leuven), LL.M. (Harvard University) and M.P.A. (Harvard University). All
opinions expressed herein are personal to the Author.
1. Lord Slynn of Hadley, Critics of the Court: A Reconsideration, in EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW IN THE ENGLISH COURTS 3–11 (Mads Andenas & Francis Jacobs eds.,
1998).
2. See Piet Eeckhout, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question,
39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 945, 945 (2002).
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under the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”) and, where appropriate, under the new Treaty on
European Union (“EU Treaty”).3 Without neglecting the
constitutional importance of the case law relating to these
matters,4 the purpose here is to explore federalism in a broader
context, in particular, by looking at the way in which EU law
imposes negative limits upon the powers retained by the Member
States, i.e., the “pervasive effects of federalism.”
Federalism, understood as the balance of power between the
federation and its component entities,5 cannot be reduced to the
principle of conferral alone. The reason is twofold. On the one
hand, federalism operates in areas of law that indisputably fall
within the competence of the EU. In addition to drawing the
borderline between EU and national competence, federalism
defines the relationship between the two levels of governance
when they occupy the same policy field. For instance, when
measuring the degree of discretion left to the Member States by a
directive, the ECJ simultaneously decides whether to allocate
powers to the EU or to the Member States.6 Likewise, when
3. The Treaty of Lisbon (“Reform Treaty”) entered into force on December 1,
2009. See The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 (entered into force
Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Reform Treaty]. The Reform Treaty modifies the Treaty on
European Union (“EU Treaty”) and replaces the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (“EC Treaty”) by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”). References to articles of the new EU Treaty will be followed by the acronym
“TEU post-Lisbon,” and references to articles of the TFEU will be followed by the
acronym “TFEU.” All references to the new EU Treaty and to the TFEU must be
understood as references to their consolidated versions. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon];
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010
O.J. C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
4. See, e.g., Germany v. Parliament, Case C-380/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-11573; The
Queen, ex rel. Alliance for Natural Health v. Sec’y of State for Health, Joined Cases C-154
& C-155/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-6451; The Queen ex rel. Swedish Match AB v. Sec’y of State
for Health, Case C-210/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-11893; Arnold André GmbH & Co. v.
Landrat des Kreises Herford, Case C-434/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-11825; The Queen v. Sec’y
of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., Case C491/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-11,453; Germany v. Parliament, Case C-376/98, [2000] E.C.R. I8419.
5. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L. 205, 205 (1990).
6. See The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas
Ireland Ltd., Case C-5/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 28 (holding that Council Directive
No. 74/577, O.J. L 316/10 (1974) (on stunning of animals before slaughter) precluded
the United Kingdom from invoking article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC) to impose a ban on
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examining whether national law conflicts with EU law, the ECJ is,
at the same time, deciding whether to limit the regulatory
capacities of the Member States.7
On the other hand, federalism also takes place beyond the
bounds laid down by article 5 TEU (“Treaty on European
Union”) post-Lisbon (article 5 EC (“Treaty Establishing the
European Community”)).8 At first sight, this statement may seem
far-fetched. Yet, no one would dispute that once there is a crossborder element or link that triggers the application of the
substantive law of the EU, no area of national law—not even
areas traditionally reserved to the Member States—remains a
“safe haven.” In this regard, it will be argued that this “pervasive
effect” of federalism has two consequences. First, it compels
Member States to “think federal.” When passing legislation, for
example, Member States must take into account any possible
nexus with EU law. Unless the application of a measure is
reserved to purely internal situations, Member States are to place
their policies in an EU law framework. Compliance with EU law
may then force national or regional legislators to regulate aspects
exports of animals to Spain). Since the interests the British authorities sought to protect
were already safeguarded by the directive, and given that they failed to prove that
Spanish slaughterhouses were in breach of the directive, the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) ruled that the United Kingdom had overstepped the margin of discretion
allowed by the EU legislator. Id. ¶¶ 19–21. More recently, the Court observed that
Council Directive No. 80/987, O.J. L 283/23 (1980) (on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the
insolvency of their employer), only compelled the Member States to adopt measures
protecting the accrued pension rights of employees in the event of the insolvency of
their employer. The Member States were not required to guarantee these rights with
public funding. Nor was there an obligation to set up a system funding these rights in
full. Yet, the ECJ considered that a national system that may occasionally lead to a
reduction of eighty percent in entitlement benefits did not comply with article 8 of the
directive. Clearly, such reduction would render the objectives laid down in the directive
devoid of purpose. See Robins v. Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-278/05,
[2007] E.C.R. I-1053, ¶ 69.
7. See generally KOEN LENAERTS, LE JUGE ET LA CONSTITUTION AUX ÉTATS-UNIS
D’AMERIQUE ET DANS L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE EUROPEEN (1988); Eugene D. Cross, PreEmption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis,
29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447 (1992); Robert Schütze, Supremacy without Pre-Emption?
The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-Emption, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1023 (2006); Stephen Weatherill, Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and Constitutional
Change in the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 13–33
(David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994).
8. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 5, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 18; EC Treaty, supra note
3, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 46.
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of family law, property law, education, public health, or direct
taxation in ways that do not necessarily reflect the first choice of
their constituency. Second, the application of EU law to areas
traditionally reserved to the Member States may produce a
spillover effect.9 Since the “pervasiveness” of EU law only applies
to cross-border situations, purely internal situations are not
affected.10 EU law allows national or regional legislators to
discriminate against non-movers.11 Yet, it is very unlikely for
reverse discrimination to be left unaddressed.12 Since non-movers
tend to be nationals, they have access to the national or regional
political process to claim the extension of EU rights to all
citizens.13 Alternatively, the national judiciary may decide to rely
on the national constitution—the principle of equality—to
improve the rights of non-movers.14 Moreover, the “pervasive
9. The “spillover” effect of EU law may be defined as the application by national
authorities of EU norms (e.g., rules, principles, concepts) to situations governed entirely
and exclusively by national law. Obviously, this effect is not mandated by EU law but
takes place either because of a policy choice (national authorities consider that the
solution adopted by the EU is a positive development that should be emulated) or
because national law prohibits to treat purely internal situations less favorably than crossborder situations (reverse discrimination). See Christiaan Timmermans, The European
Union’s Judicial System, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 393, 401 (2004) (referring to the
“spillover” effect of EU law as “a phenomenon of legal osmosis”).
10. See, e.g., Jacquet & Uecker v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Joined Cases C-64 & C65/96, [1997] E.C.R. I-3171; Ministère Public v. Mathot, Case 98/86, [1987] E.C.R. 809,
¶¶ 8–9; Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV, Case 286/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4575, ¶ 9;
Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Case 115/78, [1979] E.C.R. 399;
Ministère Public v. Auer, Case 136/78, [1979] E.C.R. 437; The Queen v. Saunders, Case
175/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1129; see also Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons and
the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?, [2002] 39 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 731.
11. See Timmermans, supra note 9, at 393–405.
12. In matters falling within the competence of the EU, a possible solution putting
an end to reverse discrimination would be harmonization. However, this solution is not
possible where the EU lacks legislative powers. Therefore, the situation would have to be
addressed internally or by means of horizontal cooperation between the Member States
(e.g., international treaty).
13. See Dzodzi v. Belgium, Joined Cases C-297/88 & C-197/89, [1990] E.C.R. I3763, ¶ 4 (where Belgian law provided that the spouse of a Belgian citizen shall be
treated as an EU citizen, rendering the rights granted by EU law applicable to purely
internal situations).
14. See Timmermans, supra note 9, at 400 (indicating that the Hoge Raad may have
been inclined to follow the case law of the ECJ relating to the principle of
proportionality and state liability in internal situations); see also R. (Alconbury Devs.
Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp., & the Regions, [2001] UKHL 23, at [51],
[2003] 2 A.C. 295, 320–21 (2001) (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (where Lord Slynn
posited that “the time has come to recognize that [the EU principle of proportionality]
is part of English administrative law, not only when judges are dealing with [EU] acts but
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effect” of EU law affects not only the substance of national law,
but also its rules of procedure. Even if the EU is committed to
respecting the procedural autonomy of the Member States, the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness15 impose a minimum
threshold of judicial protection. Like the substance of national
law, national rules of procedure may also be modified whenever
the ECJ considers that EU rights are not adequately safeguarded.
This means that the impetus to “think federal” and the
“spillover” effect of EU law are reproduced in the context of
national procedural law. When adopting rules of procedure,
national legislators must take into account whether they satisfy
EU standards of judicial protection. Likewise, the “spillover”
effect of EU law has been especially important in relation to the
law of remedies.16
This Article unfolds as follows: Section I looks at the
“pervasive effect” of EU law upon the substantive law of the
Member States. Instead of attempting to cover all cases where
this effect has arisen, a selective but in-depth approach is
preferred. In this regard, four areas falling within the
competences of the Member States will be discussed, namely
education, family law, direct taxation, and health care. Section II
is devoted to the pervasive effects of EU law upon national rules
of procedure. Taking four cases as examples, this section sets out
to demonstrate that the ECJ takes into account the general
procedural principles enshrined in national law when applying
also when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the
Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be
unnecessary and confusing.”); TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 141
(2006) (stating that the principle of proportionality has “percolated through English
administrative law”). See also the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, ruling
that reverse discrimination would breach the principle of equality as provided by the
Italian Constitution. Corte cost., 30 dec. 1997, n.443, Giur. It. 1998, III, 3, 2093, Foro It.,
1998, I, 1, 701. In support of national courts stepping in, see Miguel Poiares Maduro,
The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse
Discrimination, in THE FUTURE OF REMEDIES IN EUROPE 117–40 (Kilpatrick et al. eds.,
2000).
15. See, e.g., Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland,
Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1989, ¶¶ 2–3 (discussing equivalent effects); Comet BV v.
Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043, ¶¶ 3–5 (prohibiting
Member States from passing laws which effectively overturned EU law).
16. See M v. Home Office, [1994] 1 A.C. 377 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(extending the effect of The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame
Ltd., Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-2433, so as to allow “injunctions against the Crown”
in purely internal situations).
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the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Finally, Section
III provides a brief conclusion.
I.

FRAMING THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE MEMBER
STATES

Substantive law falling within the competences of the
Member States may be framed by the treaty provisions on nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality, free movement, EU
citizenship, and competition law applicable to the Member
States. Regardless of the substantive area of national law involved,
these treaty provisions operate as limits to the exercise of the
regulatory and taxing powers of the Member States. For instance,
the ECJ has tested the compatibility with these treaty provisions
of national measures adopted in the fields of criminal law,17
education,18 family law,19 public health,20 social security,21 and
direct taxation.22 Consequently, in order to determine whether
Member States duly operate within an EU law framework, it is
necessary to assess the scope of application of the TFEU.
In addition to the specific conditions of application for each
of these treaty provisions, a common feature shared by all is that
17. See, e.g., Geffroy & Casino France SNC, Case C-366/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-6579;
Calfa, Case C-348/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-11.
18. See, e.g., Commission v. Austria, Case C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-5969;
Commission v. Belgium, Case C-65/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-6427; Gravier v. City of Liège,
Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593.
19. See, e.g., Grunkin-Paul v. Standesamt Niebüll, Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I7639; Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613; Konstantinidis v.
Stadt Altensteig, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-1191.
20. See, e.g., The Queen ex rel. Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04,
[2006] E.C.R. I-4325; Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ
Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509; B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v.
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (Smits & Peerbooms), Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473;
Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931; Decker v.
Caisses de Maladie des Employés Privés, Case C-120/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831.
21. See, e.g., Geven v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen, Case C-213/05, [2007] E.C.R. I6347; Hartmann v. Bayern, Case C-212/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-6303; Meints v. Landbouw,
Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Case C-57/96, [1997] E.C.R. I-6689; Lepore v. Office National
des Pensions, Joined Cases C-45–46/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-6497; Paraschi v.
Landesversicherungsanstalt Wurttemberg, Case C-349/87, [1991] E.C.R. I-4501.
22. See, e.g., Finanzamt Dinslaken v. Meindl, Case C-329/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-1107;
Commission v. Sweden, Case C-104/06, [2007] E.C.R. I-671; Marks v. Halsey, Case C446/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-10,837; Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93,
[1995] E.C.R. I-225; Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, Case C-80/94,
[1995] E.C.R. I-2493.
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there must be a link or nexus with EU law. No link exists where
the situation at issue is purely internal (or does not have an EU
dimension, in the case of competition law). Accordingly, in the
absence of a link, EU law cannot display its pervasive effect.
Situations that remain purely internal (without an EU
dimension) are thus entirely governed by national law. As
recognized by the ECJ, reverse discrimination is then permitted.
A Member State may discriminate against persons not benefiting
from the protection of EU law.
It has been argued that this link is no less than the
reformulation of the principle of conferral for the judicial
enforcement of treaty limits imposed upon the Member States.
Others have argued that it enshrines the principle of
subsidiarity.23 Be that as it may, the truth is that determining the
presence or the absence of a link with EU law has significant
repercussions on the vertical allocation of powers.
The laxer the way the link with EU law is interpreted, the
wider the EU law framework becomes, and the fewer situations
where reverse discrimination may arise. From a federal
perspective, a broad link with EU law would significantly restrict
the exercise of competences pertaining to the Member States.24
On the contrary, a strict interpretation would leave more room to
the national legislator.
The case law relating to free movement and EU citizenship
indicates that the ECJ has opted for a rather broad interpretation
of the required EU link. This has been done in different ways.
Thus, the ECJ has applied EU law to situations where barriers are
erected to insulate a territory from other parts of the same
23. The principle of subsidiarity is defined in article 5(3) TEU post-Lisbon. This
treaty provision states:
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved at Union level.
TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 5(3), 2010 O.J. C 83/13, at 18; see also Peter Oliver,
Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28–30 (ex 30–36) EC, [1999] 36 Common
Mkt. L. Rev. 783, 784 (arguing that “[t]he draftsmen of the Treaty plainly took the view
that it is no business of the [EU] to prevent Member States from imposing restrictions
on trade in goods and services within their own territory. To use terminology which is
more fashionable in some quarters, it is a question of subsidiarity.”).
24. See SÍOFRA O’LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP:
FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZENSHIP 276 (1996).
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Member State.25 It has also adopted a relaxed approach when
examining whether a contested national measure had a deterrent
effect on the exercise of EU rights.26 Likewise, EU law applies
when free movers return to their own Member State.27
Furthermore, it is possible for a party to invoke the EU rights of a
third party, insofar as there is a “direct link” between the legal
position of the first party and the rights of the third party.28
Concerning the application of the treaty provisions on EU
citizenship, it is sufficient that a national of a Member State
lawfully resides (or has resided) in a Member State other than
that of his or her nationality.29
Finally, far from being rigid and immovable, the EU law
framework has “shifting contours.” This is due to the fact that,
even if there is in principle a breach of EU law, Member States
can still invoke reasons of general interest recognized by the EU
to justify their actions. Therefore, provided that the Member
State concerned relies on one of these reasons and complies with
the principle of proportionality, the national action will be
upheld.30 Ultimately, it is thus for the ECJ, as interpreter of the
25. See, e.g., Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98, [2000]
E.C.R. I-4139; Pistre, Barthes, Milhau & Oberti, Joined Cases C-321–24/94, [1997]
E.C.R. I-2343; Lancry v. Direction Générale des Douanes, Joined Cases C-363, 407–
11/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-3957. More recently, see Gouvernment de la Communauté
Française v. Gouvernement Flamand, Case C-212/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1683.
26. See Jia v. Migrationsverket, Case C-1/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-1; Carpenter v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-60/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279.
27. See De Cuyper v. Office National de l’Emploi, Case C-406/04, [2006] E.C.R. I6947, ¶¶ 37–47; Tas-Hagen v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad,
Case C-192/05, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,451, ¶¶ 24–34.
28. See Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-6421,
¶¶ 17–21.
29. See Zhu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. I9925, ¶ 45. When the treaty provisions on EU citizenship apply, they can be relied
against the Member State whose nationality the EU citizen possesses. See Grunkin-Paul v.
Standesamt Niebüll, Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, ¶ 21; Turpeinen, Case C520/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,685, ¶ 18; D’Hoop v. Office National de l’Emploi, Case C224/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-6191, ¶ 40.
30. When applying this principle to restrictions on the fundamental freedoms or
EU citizenship rights, the ECJ has often applied the “least restrictive alternative” test.
However, the application of this test is not mechanical. Due to its open-textured nature,
the principle of proportionality is highly influenced by the legal and factual context in
which it is applied. It is an area where casuistry largely controls. See TRIDIMAS, supra note
14, at 214–18; see also CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU 112–13,
243–44 (2004). For a recent example where the ECJ appears to depart from the “least
restrictive alternative” to respect fully Member State responsibility for road safety, see
Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519. In the same vein, for the social
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TFEU, to evaluate through the medium of balancing whether the
competences retained by the Member States have been
consistently exercised in an EU law framework.
Let us now turn to illustrating this line of analysis with some
cases involving national law on access to higher or university
education, the giving of surnames, the mobility of same-sex
married couples, direct taxation, and patient mobility.
A. Education: Access to Higher or University Education
Articles 165 and 166 TFEU (articles 149 and 150 EC)
provide that it is for the Member States to set up the contents of,
and to organize, education and vocational training.31
Accordingly, a Member State may decide either to require
candidates wishing to pursue university studies to pass an entry
examination or to grant free access upon completion of
secondary studies. Each policy pursues a legitimate aim. While
the former tries to make sure that there are sufficient places and
resources available for the best students, the latter aims to reduce
social differences by giving the same opportunities to all students.
Obviously, the latter policy is only sustainable insofar as the
education system can cope with the demand for specific courses.
If the number of applicants is too high, then the national
authorities would certainly be forced to redefine their policy,
establishing a maximum number of students per course (a system
of numerus clausus).
However, the fluctuations in demand are not conditioned by
national students or students residing in a Member State alone,
but also by European students wishing to study outside their
home country. Indeed, ever since Gravier v. City of Liège,32 the ECJ
has consistently held that free movement law covers access to
vocational training, understood as both higher and university
education. Accordingly, even if the Member States remain
competent to regulate access to higher and university education,
protection of victims of road traffic accidents, see Commission v. Italy, Case C-518/06,
[2009] E.C.R. I-3491. For public health, see Commission v. Italy, Case C-531/06, [2009]
E.C.R. I-4103, and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes v. Saarland, Joined Cases C-171–
72/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-4171.
31. TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 165–66, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 47; EC Treaty, supra note 3,
arts. 149–50, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 112–13.
32. Gravier v. City of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593.
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their policy choices are limited by free movement law. For
instance, students having completed secondary studies in France
and failing to pass the national entry examination may wish to
move to Belgium where access is easier. Due to the difference in
size of both countries,33 the impact of free movement upon the
Belgian education system could be rather large. However, even if
there was a flood of EU students deciding to study in Belgium,
this Member State could, as a matter of principle, not deny access
to higher or university education on a discriminatory basis. If
there is free access for all students holding a Belgian secondary
education degree, then access has to be granted to all EU
students holding comparable qualifications.
In Commission v. Belgium (the certificat d’enseignement
secondaire supérieur (“CESS”) case) decided in 2004,34 faced with
such a factual scenario, the Court ruled that by submitting
holders of secondary education diplomas awarded in other
Member States to additional entry requirements, while not doing
so for holders of the Belgian CESS, Belgium had breached article
18 TFEU (article 12 EC).35 One year later, in Commission v.
Austria,36 the Court repeated that by imposing additional entry
requirements to holders of secondary education diplomas
awarded in a Member State other than Austria, this Member
State had breached article 18 TFEU (article 12 EC). As opposed
to Belgium, which provided no justification, Austria justified its
legislation by (1) the existence and homogeneity of its higher or
university education system, (2) the prevention of the abuse of
EU law and (3) the honoring of a previous international
agreement. In relation to the first justification, Austria argued
that if students who completed their secondary studies in a
Member State other than Austria, and failed to pass the national
entry examination therein, were given automatic access to
Austrian universities, then the system would be put under
enormous financial and structural pressure.37 However, the ECJ
33. France had about 64 million inhabitants as of about 2008, whereas Belgium has
about 4.2 million French speaking citizens. See France Prioux, Recent Demographic
Developments in France: Expectancy Still Rising, 63 POPULATION 375, 375 (English ed.,
2008); CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2010 68 (2009).
34. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-65/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-6427.
35. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.
36. Commission v. Austria, Case C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-5969.
37. Id. ¶¶ 49–50.
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held that there were other less restrictive means to counter the
excessive demand for specific courses, such as establishing an
entry examination or setting minimum grade requirements.38 By
not proving that the system would collapse unless the
discriminatory legislation remained in force, Austria’s
justification did not comply with the principle of
proportionality.39 As to the second justification, Austria argued
that its law sought to prevent Austrian students from abusing EU
law.40 Nonetheless, the Court recalled empathically that far from
being an abuse, the possibility for a student of the EU who
studied outside Austria to be treated equally amounted to “the
very essence of the principle of free movement for students
guaranteed by the Treaty.”41 Finally, regarding the last
justification, the Court ruled that article 351 TFEU (article 307
EC) does not govern intra-Union situations.42 As a result, the ECJ
stated that Austria failed to fulfill its obligations under the
treaty.43
From these two cases, it follows that Belgium and Austria are
forced, in effect, to modify their policies on access to higher or
university education, not as a result of EU harmonization, which
is not allowed in the field of education or vocational training, but
because of the enforcement of the treaty provisions on free
movement and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. If
Belgium and Austria decide to counter the increasing demand
for higher or university education in a way consistent with these
provisions, they might have to consider establishing a numerus
clausus system, which is not in line with the local traditions and
certainly not popular with the local electorate. However, after
harshly criticizing the ruling of the ECJ, Austrian authorities
reserved a percentage of study places to holders of an Austrian
secondary education diploma. For instance, in relation to
medical and pharmaceutical studies, a quota of seventy-five
percent was adopted.44 The Communauté française de Belgique
38. Id. ¶ 61.
39. See id. ¶ 66.
40. Id. ¶ 54.
41. Id. ¶ 70.
42. Id. ¶ 73.
43. See id. ¶ 74.
44. Clemens Rieder, Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, Judgment of the Court
(Second Chamber) 7 July 2005, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1711, 1711 (2006).
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enacted similar measures.45 Although it did not take long for the
Commission to send a letter of formal notice, infringement
proceedings were put on hold.46 The Commission decided to
grant Austria and Belgium a period of five years during which
they must supply data proving that the contested measures are
necessary to remedy the shortage of health care professionals
practicing in Austria and Belgium, while maintaining an
adequate level of quality in the delivery of health care services.47
Regardless of the follow-up of these two cases, positive as
well as negative implications of free movement must be
recognized by the Member States. Selective application of this
principle would put the EU project at risk. Put simply, Member
States must take “the bitter with the sweet” of free movement law.
B.

Family Law: National Rules on Surnames

It is uncontested that Member States retain the autonomy to
regulate surnames. Some Member States prefer to adopt a
“single-surname” system, whereas others allow parents to give
more than one surname to their child. Yet, just as it happens with
education policy, the law relating to surnames is also limited by
free movement and EU citizenship rights. Three cases illustrate
this point.
In Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, the Court began by
recognizing that EU law did not contain rules concerning the
transliteration of Greek names into the Roman alphabet.48 The
Court nonetheless ruled that German law, which prevented Mr.
Konstantinidis—a Greek national working in Germany as a selfemployed masseur—from correcting the transcription of his
name, was contrary to article 49 TFEU (article 43 EC). The Court
reasoned that a modification in the spelling of his name could
give rise to its different pronunciation, resulting in his clients
confusing him with others.49 Konstantinidis was decided in 1993,
45. Id. at 1717, n.39.
46. Id. at 1716.
47. Commission Press Release, IP/07/1788 (Nov. 28, 2007). In the meantime, the
issue reached the ECJ on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Belgian
Constitutional Court. See Bressol v. Gouvernement de la Communauté Française, Case
C-73/08 (ECJ Apr. 13, 2010) (not yet reported).
48. Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-1191, ¶¶ 13–
14.
49. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.
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before the entry into force of the EU citizenship provisions. Yet,
it will be shown that the rationale underlying Konstantinidis does
not differ from that of subsequent cases, namely, national law
putting an EU citizen at a disadvantage simply because he or she
has exercised his or her EU rights infringes EU law.50
Ten years later, in Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Mr. Garcia Avello
and Ms. Weber—a Spanish-Belgian couple living in Belgium—
decided to follow Spanish law when naming their son and
daughter; they used the first surname of the father followed by
the first surname of the mother (“Garcia Weber”).51 However,
the application was rejected by the Belgian Registrar for Birth,
Marriages and Deaths, on the ground that, in Belgium, children
bear their father’s surname.52 The ECJ held that, even though
rules relating to surnames remain within the competences of the
Member States, insofar as there is a link with EU law, such
competences must be exercised in a way consistent with the
fundamental principles thereof.53 Unlike Mr. Konstantinidis, the
son and daughter of Mr. Garcia Avello and Ms. Weber were not
economically active. Yet, since they were Spanish nationals
lawfully residing in Belgium, they could invoke the EU
citizenship provisions.54 To this effect, the ECJ ruled that Belgian
law contravened articles 18 and 20 TFEU (articles 12 and 17 EC),
by putting children with dual nationality at a disadvantage. They
would have to cope with the inconveniences at professional and
private levels resulting from the difficulties in benefiting, in one
50. Advocate General Jacobs agreed with the ECJ, holding that the German rule on
transliteration gave rise to discrimination. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
Konstantinidis, [1993] E.C.R. I-1191, ¶ 46. However, he added that the challenged
measure could also be set aside for non-compliance with fundamental rights. Id. The
Advocate General reckoned that a person having exercised his right to free movement is
“entitled to a common code of fundamental values” which is binding upon the host
Member State and that regardless of the presence of discrimination, a free mover “is
entitled to say ‘civis europeus sum’ and to invoke that status in order to oppose any
violation of his fundamental rights.” Id.
51. Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613, ¶ 15.
52. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
53. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Elsen v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt fur Angestellte, Case C135/99, [2000] E.C.R. I-10,409, ¶ 33).
54. See id. ¶¶ 27–28 (pointing out that the fact that the children also have Belgian
nationality was irrelevant). In any event, the ECJ indicated that Belgium could not deny
recognition of their Spanish nationality “by imposing additional requirements, with a
view to the exercise of fundamental freedoms provided for in the treaty.” See Airola v.
Commission, Case 21/74, [1975] E.C.R. 221, ¶¶ 10–11; Micheletti v. Delegación del
Gobierno en Cantabria, Case C-369/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-4239, ¶ 10.
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Member State of which they are nationals, from the documents
or diplomas obtained in another Member State of which they are
also nationals.55 Belgium tried to justify its law on two grounds:
preventing the risks of confusion as to the identity or parentage
of persons and facilitating integration.56 The ECJ rejected both
arguments. First, it held that the Belgian measure was not
indispensable, as it could adapt itself to accommodate
circumstances such as the ones of the case.57 Moreover, in light of
the scale of migration within the EU, the identity and family ties
of a person residing in a Member State cannot be assessed solely
by reference to the laws applicable in that Member State.58 On
the contrary, the recognition of the rules governing names of
other Member States could actually contribute to reducing the
risks of confusion.59 Second, Belgian law was neither necessary
nor appropriate to promote integration, given that it hindered
the coexistence of different systems for the attribution of
surnames of persons residing in the country.60 Consequently,
Belgian law could not be justified.
Finally, in Grunkin-Paul,61 delivered in 2008, similar
questions as those addressed in Garcia Avello were raised. Dr. Paul
and Mr. Grunkin—two German citizens living in Denmark—
decided to name their son Leonhard Matthias Grunkin-Paul. In
spite of the fact that Leonhard is German, Danish law was
applicable because his parents resided in Denmark at the time of
his birth. The use of a double-barreled surname composed of the
surnames of both the father and the mother was permitted under
Danish law.62 However, when his parents approached the
German registry office, the latter refused to recognize the
surname of the child.63 German authorities reasoned that, in
accordance with article 10 of the Law Introducing the German
Civil Code, the surname of a person is determined by the law of
his or her nationality.64 Since the German Civil Code precluded
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Garcia-Avello, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613, ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
See id. ¶¶ 47–49.
See id. ¶¶ 42–49.
See id. ¶¶ 42–43.
Grunkin-Paul v. Standesamt Niebüll, Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639.
See id. ¶ 3.
See id. ¶ 7.
Id.
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the use of a double-barreled surname, the registration of
Leonhard’s surname as provided by Danish law was not possible.
In civil proceedings brought by Leonhard’s parents, the referring
court questioned the compatibility of the German conflict of laws
rule with articles 18 and 21 TFEU (articles 12 and 18 EC).65
At the outset, the Court recognized that the rules governing
surnames fall under the competences of the Member States.
However, in the presence of a link with EU law, the Member
States must exercise this competence in compliance with EU
law.66 It was clear that the link existed, because Leonhard is a
German citizen living in Denmark. In relation to article 18 TFEU
(article 12 EC), the ECJ found no discrimination. German law
applied to all German citizens alike.67 Yet, the German conflict of
laws rule in question, as applied in the concrete case, led to an
outcome in breach of article 21 TFEU (article 18 EC). As
indicated in Garcia Avello, German law could cause serious
“inconveniences for [Leonhard] at both professional and private
levels.”68 Leonhard’s German nationality meant that only
Germany could issue him a passport, but this passport would
contain a different name than the one he was given in Denmark.
These divergences would raise doubts concerning his identity
and suspicions of misrepresentation. Likewise, in recalling Garcia
Avello, the ECJ held that it would be difficult for Leonhard to use
the diplomas or documents obtained in Denmark when
returning to Germany. Therefore, by placing some German
nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised
their freedom to live and reside in another Member State,
German law constituted a restriction of the rights guaranteed by
article 21 TFEU (article 18 EC).69
The ECJ rejected the justifications put forward by Germany.
According to Germany, its legislation sought to ensure that
siblings have the same name. Additionally, Germany argued that
its law treated all persons with the same nationality alike.70 The
ECJ responded that the grounds put forward by Germany could
not justify the restriction under circumstances such as those of
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 16.
See id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Id. ¶ 30.
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the case.71 In particular, the ECJ pointed out that the German
conflict of laws rule as well as provisions relating to surnames was
not without exception. For instance, Germany also applied the
criterion of residence where one of the parents lives in
Germany.72 Likewise, the use of double-barreled surnames was
permitted for German citizens where one of the parents is a
national of another Member State and the name is given
pursuant to the laws thereof.73 In any event, the ECJ pointed out
that Germany had not proven—and in fact, not even argued—
that the Danish law on surnames was contrary to its public
policy.74 Therefore, Leonhard could register his surname given
in accordance with Danish law with the German authorities.
In contrast to Konstantinidis, Garcia Avello and Grunkin-Paul
involved EU citizens relying on EU law against their own state.
These cases concern the capacity of Member States to define
rules on surnames that may be given to their own citizens.
Nationality, understood as the connecting factor between a
Member State and its own citizens, is not always strong enough to
insulate national law from the application of EU law.75 Stated
differently, where there is a link that triggers the application of
EU law, the bond between the EU and its citizens may be
stronger than that between a Member State and its own citizens.
At first sight, this could seem at odds with the first paragraph of
article 20 TFEU (article 17 EC), which states that “Every person
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not
replace national citizenship.”76 However, even though EU
citizenship is established by reference to national citizenship, it
does not mean that the former is subjected to the latter. On the
contrary, provided that there is an EU law nexus, EU citizenship
may limit the application of rules having nationality as their
connecting factor.77
71. Id. ¶ 31.
72. See id.
73. See id. ¶ 37.
74. See id. ¶ 38.
75. See id. ¶¶ 2, 39.
76. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 20, 2010 O.J. C. 83, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
17, 2006 O.J. C. 321 E, at 49.
77. See Stephen Hall, Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights, 21
EUR. L. REV. 129, 129 (1996).
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Finally, before turning to the next section, imagine the
following scenario. An EU citizen having the nationality of
Member State “A” moves to Member State “B.” By means of
deception, he then acquires by naturalization the nationality of
Member State “B,” losing simultaneously his original nationality.
Subsequently, Member State “B” decides to revoke its nationality
and because of the non-revival of the original nationality, this
person becomes stateless. Does EU law oppose this situation,
which is inspired from Rottmann, decided in 2010?78 In that case,
the ECJ held that “it is not contrary to [EU] law, in particular to
Article 17 EC [article 20 TFEU], for a Member State to withdraw
from a citizen of the Union the nationality of that State acquired
by naturalization when that nationality has been obtained by
deception, on condition that the decision to withdraw observes
the principle of proportionality.”79 In cross-border situations, a
Member State does not enjoy full discretion to strip a citizen of
the Union from his nationality and, consequently, from his EU
citizenship. On the contrary, the ECJ reasoned that national
authorities must strike the right balance between the public
interest of Member States in protecting nationality—understood
as “the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between
78. Rottmann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08 (ECJ Mar. 2, 2010) (not yet reported); see
also Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Rottmann (ECJ Mar. 2, 2010) (not yet
reported) (concluding that, even though rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality
remain within the competence of the Member States, these powers must be exercised in
compliance with EU law; for instance, treaty provisions on EU citizenship would oppose
a national law that deprives an EU citizen of his nationality simply because he
established his permanent residence in a Member State other than that of which he is a
national). In the Advocate General’s view, “in compliance with EU law” must be
understood broadly, so that it includes any legal norm pertaining to the EU legal order,
notably customary international law. Id. The Advocate General observed that, while
international law sought to reduce situations giving rise to stateless persons, it
authorized the loss of nationality acquired by intentional deception. Id. Therefore, since
Mr. Rottmann had acquired the German nationality by fraudulent means, EU law did
not preclude Germany from ordering its revocation. Likewise, Austria was not obliged to
revive Mr. Rottmann’s original nationality. Id. In any event, if the revocation of his
German nationality applied retroactively, Austrian law alone would decide whether Mr.
Rottmann was entitled to recover his Austrian nationality, provided that the principle of
equivalence was respected. Id.
79. Rottmann (ECJ Mar. 2, 2010) (not yet reported), ¶ 59. As to the principle of
proportionality, the ECJ held that, when examining a decision withdrawing
naturalization, the national court must take into account the implications of such
decision for the person concerned and his family, the gravity of the offence committed
by that person, the time elapsed between the withdrawal decision and the naturalization
decision, and whether the recovery of his original nationality is possible. Id. ¶ 56.
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[a Member State] and its nationals and also the reciprocity of
rights and duties”80—and the individual rights stemming from
EU citizenship.
C. Mobility of Same-Sex Married Couples
Another aspect of family law that is likely one day to find its
way to Luxembourg concerns the mobility of same-sex married
couples. Like national rules on surnames, no one would question
the premise that legalizing same-sex marriage is a political
decision to be taken at the national level. Although same-sex
couples enjoy some sort of legal recognition in the majority of
Member States, only Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and most
recently Sweden, allow same-sex marriage. Problems may arise
when same-sex married couples decide to move to another
Member State where their civil status is not recognized, and,
accordingly, they cannot fully benefit from the protection of EU
law.
Directive 2004/3881 adopted a broad definition of “family
member” so as to include registered partnerships.82 However, the
European Parliament was unable to mobilize the Council to
mention expressly that the term “spouse” laid down in article
2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 also applies to spouses of the same
sex. The EU legislator opted for a hands-off approach, leaving
this sensitive decision to judicial interpretation.83 Indeed, if a
national court asks for guidance in the interpretation of this

80. Id. ¶ 51.
81. Council Directive on the Rights of Citizens of the Union and Their Family
Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, No.
2004/38, 2004 O.J. L 158/77 [hereinafter Citizenship Directive], corrected version in
2005 O.J. L 197/34 (dealing with the right of citizens of the Union and their family
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States).
82. The non-registered partner of an EU citizen is not considered a family member
under the Directive. Id. pmbl. (5), art. 2(2), 2004 O.J. L 158, at 79, 88. However, article 3
provides that the host Member State must facilitate the entry and residence of persons
with whom an EU citizen has a durable relationship, provided that it can be duly
attested. Id. art. 3(2), 2004 O.J. L 158, at 89.
83. See HELEN TONER, PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS, FREE MOVEMENT, AND EU LAW 60–68
(2004) (explaining that the regime laid down in the directive was the result of a political
compromise among conservative and liberal Member States).
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concept, the ECJ would have no choice but to provide a
definition through the medium of common-lawmaking.84
When confronted with the interpretation of “spouse,” the
ECJ has three alternatives. First, under the “state of origin
principle,” the term “spouse” may be interpreted in accordance
with the civil law under which the marriage took place. This
option would be the most favorable to same-sex couples, since
the exercise of free movement rights would have no adverse
repercussion on their civil status. However, the host Member
State could object that this interpretation would be too intrusive,
causing excessive erosion to its competence to regulate family law
and exercise its police powers.
Second, under the “host state principle,” the ECJ could
defer to the laws of the host Member State. This option has been
followed by the EU legislator when defining the legal effects of
registered partnerships. Indeed, registered partners are
considered family members only “if the legislation of the host
Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to
marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the
relevant legislation of the host Member State.”85
Finally, the ECJ, under the concept of judicial autonomy,
could adopt its own independent definition of “spouse” without
referring to either the laws of the home or the host State. The
ECJ could choose, for example, to exclude same-sex marriages
from the scope of the directive. This solution would foster

84. See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European
Union: A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 55 (2006).
The authors point out that the attitude of the EU legislator is in clear contrast with that
of the U.S. Congress. Id. Not only did Congress rule out federal common law in
interpreting marriage, but it also exempted states from giving effect to marriages (or
equivalent relationships) contracted under the laws of a sister state. Id. To this effect, the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) provides that, for the purposes of federal law,
marriage is defined as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife,” and the word spouse is defined as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or a wife.” Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). In addition, the DOMA also
states that “No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.” Id. § 2(a), 28
U.S.C. § 1738C; see also TONER, supra note 83, at 42–43.
85. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, art. 2(2)(b), 2004 O.J. L 158, at 88.
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uniformity and legal certainty, but it would disregard the
sensitivities of some Member States to the benefit of others.
Although the ECJ has not yet defined the term “spouse”
under Directive 2004/38, one may draw some interesting insights
from D & Sweden v. Council.86 There, the ECJ was called upon to
define marriage with a view to determining whether certain
benefits reserved to married couples under the staff regulations
of officials of the European Communities (“staff regulations”)
could be extended to same-sex registered partnerships. At the
time, the staff regulations made no mention of registered
partnerships.87 This, however, did not discourage the applicant
and the Swedish Government from urging the ECJ to follow the
law under which the partnership had been registered.88 They
argued that if the state of registration puts same-sex registered
partnerships and marriages on a similar footing, then the staff
regulations should be interpreted in the same vein.89 Benefits
given to married couples should also be given to same-sex
registered partnerships. However, the ECJ disagreed. It began by
recalling that the Council had rejected a similar amendment
proposed by the Swedish Government.90 Further, the ECJ
observed that “It is not in question that, according to the
definition generally accepted by the Member States, the term
marriage means a union between two persons of the opposite
sex.”91 Finally, the ECJ noted that, even though there was a
common trend in the Member States towards giving some sort of
legal recognition to same-sex unions, these new legal
arrangements could not be assimilated to marriage.92 As a result,
the ECJ confirmed the ruling of the European General Court
(“EGC”)—formerly the Court of First Instance—and dismissed
the appeal.
After this ruling, the staff regulations were amended so that
certain benefits previously reserved to married couples are now
also available to staff members with a registered partnership,
86.
4319.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

D v. Council (D & Sweden), Joined Cases C-122 & C-125/99, [2001] E.C.R. ISee id. ¶¶ 2, 12.
See id. ¶ 29.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 36.
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provided that four conditions are fulfilled.93 One of these
conditions is that “the couple has no access to legal marriage in a
Member State,” that is, “where the members of the couple [do
not] meet all the conditions laid down by the legislation of a
Member State permitting marriage of such a couple.”94
Therefore, where a same-sex couple has access to legal marriage,
it cannot claim benefits under a registered partnership. This
suggests that the staff regulations recognize same-sex marriage
legally contracted under the law of a Member State, and only
where the latter is not possible, same-sex couples with a
registered partnership may claim benefits. Accordingly, the
definition of marriage provided by the ECJ in D & Sweden v.
Council appears to have been superseded by the EU legislator.
D & Sweden v. Council dealt with a common definition of
marriage in a field of exclusive competence of the EU—the staff
regulations; as such, the case involved questions of statutory
interpretation alone. Perhaps that is why the ECJ decided to
accommodate its interpretation of the staff regulations with the
prevailing view of the national legal systems, as opposed to the
notions embraced by a limited number of them.95 The ruling of
the ECJ in this case cannot, however, be extended without
reservation to the mobility of same-sex married couples.96 D &
Sweden v. Council did not examine the alterations in the civil
status of same-sex couples resulting from free movement. The
application of the treaty provisions on free movement to national
measures regulating the civil status of same-sex couples operates
to frame the exercise of legislative powers by the Member States.
Though delivered in the context of social law, Maruko97
illustrates this point. In this case, the ECJ was asked to clarify
whether a German compulsory occupational pension scheme
that awarded benefits to married couples while refusing them to
partnerships registered in Germany was compatible with
Directive 2000/78. German law reserves marriage to different-sex
couples while same-sex couples have access only to registered
93. See Council Regulation Amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the
European Communities, No. 723/2004, annex I, ¶ 97, 2004 O.J. L 124/1, at 37.
94. Id.
95. See D & Sweden, [2001] E.C.R. I-4319, ¶ 39.
96. See TONER, supra note 83, at 187.
97. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, Case C-267/06, [2008]
E.C.R. I-1757.
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partnerships.98 For Mr. Maruko, whose registered male partner
was insured under this pension scheme, this meant that he could
not claim a survivor’s pension.99 He challenged the German
pension scheme on the ground that it was contrary to Directive
2000/78.100 After noting that the payments under the pension
scheme constituted “pay” within the meaning of article 3 of
Directive 2000/78, the ECJ held that “civil status and the benefits
flowing there from are matters which fall within the competence
of the Member States and [EU] law does not detract from that
competence. However, it must be recalled that in the exercise of
that competence the Member States must comply with [EU]
law.”101 For the case at issue, this meant that Germany was free to
decide whether same-sex registered partnerships enjoy a
comparable civil status to marriage. If so, then any difference in
treatment on grounds of sexual orientation produced by
measures falling within the scope of application of Directive
2000/78/EC is forbidden.102 Thus, the ECJ ruled that it was for
the referring court to evaluate whether, under German law,
same-sex registered partnerships and marriage stand on
comparable footing. If the finding is in the affirmative, then the
German pension scheme would be in violation of the directive,
given that a widower’s pension was refused on the ground of the
applicant’s sexuality.103
In the context of free movement, the ECJ should embark on
an analogous legal reasoning. While Member States enjoy
absolute discretion over the definition and legal effects of
marriage, registered partnership, divorce, and other domestic
issues, a change in the civil status of incoming same-sex couples
may be seen as an obstacle to free movement.104 Carpenter105 and
the cases that followed it point in this direction. Just as “it is clear
that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be
98. See id. ¶ 63.
99. See id. ¶¶ 22–23.
100. Id. ¶ 23.
101. Id. ¶ 59; see also Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Maruko, [2008] E.C.R.
I-1757, ¶ 77.
102. See, e.g., Eman v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag,
Case C-300/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-8055, ¶¶ 44–45, 52–53.
103. See Maruko, [2008] E.C.R. I-1757, ¶ 72.
104. See TONER, supra note 83, at 254–57.
105. Carpenter v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-60/00, [2002] E.C.R. I6279, ¶¶ 38–39.
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detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions
under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom,”106
the adverse repercussions deriving from a change in the civil
status of same-sex married couples would hinder free movement.
As a consequence, in order not to recognize their legal status, the
host Member State would be forced to rely on overriding reasons
of general interest. The justification advanced by that Member
State would have to be applied in compliance with fundamental
rights, particularly the protection of family life.107 Indeed, as
indicated by recital 31 of Directive 2004/38, implementing
Member States are bound by fundamental rights and the
principle of non-discrimination.108 Additionally, since the EU law
framework stems directly from the TFEU, the EU legislator must
also abide by it. This implies that the directive must be
interpreted with a view to facilitating free movement, while
having regard to the justifications put forward by the host
Member State. Put simply, the definition of “spouse” must be
consistent with the rationale underpinning the legal basis of the
directive.
Of the three aforementioned alternatives, it seems that the
first option, the state of origin principle, is the most consistent
with the fundamental freedoms. However, given that the EU
legislator deferred to the judiciary, it seems appropriate to
proceed on a case-by-case analysis. Thus, in principle, the
definition of “spouse” would not exclude same-sex marriages
legally entered into under the laws of a Member State. Yet, the
host Member State would still be entitled to invoke overriding
reasons of general interest in order to deny their legal
106. See id. ¶ 39.
107. See Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. Eind, Case C-291/05,
[2007] E.C.R. I-10,719, ¶ 44; Commission v. Germany, Case C-441/02, [2006] E.C.R. I3449, ¶ 109; Commission v. Spain, Case C-503/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1097, ¶ 41;
Commission v. Spain, Case C-157/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2911, ¶ 26; Mouvement Contre le
Racisme, L’antisémitisme et la Xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgium, Case C-459/99,
[2002] E.C.R. I-6591, ¶ 53; Carpenter, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, ¶ 38; see also TONER, supra
note 83, at 85–88 (opining that “[c]learly, the argument that the same-sex couple are
‘family members’ under the [EU] law regulations is not ruled out by the current
[European Court of Human Rights] stance”).
108. Citizenship Directive No. 2004/38, pmbl. ¶ 31, 2004 O.J. L 158, at 86. This
would mean, for example, that once a person is qualified as “a family member,” the host
Member State cannot deprive him or her from receiving the benefits to which he or she
is entitled under Directive 2004/38/EC just because of his or her sexual orientation,
age, race, and the like. See id.

2010] FEDERALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW AT THE ECJ 1361
recognition. Therefore, the term “spouse” laid down in Directive
2004/38 must be interpreted in light of the principle of mutual
recognition. The ECJ would thus engage in a balancing exercise,
scrutinizing whether the reasons put forward by the host Member
State pass muster under free movement law.
D. Direct Taxation
In the absence of harmonization,109 the ECJ has consistently
held that direct taxation falls within the competence of the
Member States.110 National legislators are competent to choose
the tax base, tax rate, and tax advantages. Most importantly, they
enjoy absolute discretion to decide whether to exercise their tax
powers as a “home state” (taxing the income of fiscal residents
regardless of where it is produced) or alternatively as a “source
state” (taxing the income on a territorial basis even if the
taxpayer is not a resident).111
As shown in the previous sections, insofar as there is a link
with EU law, policy choices in the realm of direct taxation may
not disadvantage EU citizens who exercise their rights under EU
law. However, in contrast to education policy or family law, not
all negative changes in the tax status of free movers may be read
as being contrary to the treaty provisions. Given that the TFEU
allows different national tax systems to exist side-by-side, adverse
financial repercussions stemming directly from this juxtaposition

109. See TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 114–15, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 94–95; EC Treaty, supra
note 3, arts. 94–95, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 79–80. Some aspects of direct taxation can be
harmonized, such as the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions,
transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member
States. See Council Directive on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers,
Divisions, Transfer of Assets and Exchange of Shares Concerning Companies of
Different Member States, No. 90/434, 1990 O.J. L 225/1. Yet, owing to the fact that
unanimity is the voting rule for the harmonization of fiscal measures, there is little
secondary legislation on direct taxation.
110. See Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v. Burda GmbH, Case C-284/06, [2008]
E.C.R. I-4571, ¶ 69; Oy AA v. Finland, Case C-231/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-6373, ¶ 18; Test
Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C374/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-11,673, ¶ 36; Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm’rs of Inland
Revenue, Case C-196/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-995, ¶ 40; Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, Case
C-446/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-10,837, ¶ 29; Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v. Comm’rs of Inland
Revenue, Joined Cases C-397 & C-410/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-1727, ¶ 37.
111. See Suzanne Kingston, A Light in the Darkness: Recent Developments in the ECJ’s
Direct Tax Jurisprudence, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1321 (2007).
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are not caught by these provisions.112 Therefore, EU law does
not, as such, preclude double taxation of cross-border activities
resulting from the interaction of two national tax systems.
Avoiding the erosion of the fiscal powers retained by the
Member States while at the same time ensuring compliance with
the treaty provisions on free movement seems a very complex
and delicate task, especially if one bears in mind the sensitivities
that direct taxation awakens in the Member States. Relying on
the principle of non-discrimination, the ECJ has, nonetheless,
taken important steps towards the EU law framing of the exercise
of national taxing powers. Yet due to the different criteria
adopted by national legislators in defining their tax jurisdiction,
the ECJ has refined the principle of non-discrimination
according to whether a Member State is acting in a home state or
source state capacity.
Acting as a home state, a Member State may not distinguish
between domestic income and income produced in another
Member State.113 For corporate income taxation, for example,
this means that if a Member State taxes all income generated by
its residents regardless of where it is produced and grants a tax
credit which is offset against tax on domestic dividends, the same
financial treatment must be extended to dividends produced by
companies located abroad.114 Similarly, tax incentives granted to
residents investing domestically must also be accorded to
residents investing in cross-border activities.115
As for tax jurisdiction exercised territorially, in a source state
capacity, the principle of non-discrimination essentially prevents
112. See Block v. Finanzamt Kaufbueren, Case C-67/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-884, ¶ 35;
Deutsche Shell v. Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen, Case C-293/06, [2008] E.C.R. I1129, ¶ 43; Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-6421, ¶
45; Lindfors v. Finland, Case C-365/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7183, ¶ 34; see also Opinion of
Advocate General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class IV of ACT Group Litig., [2006] E.C.R.
I-11,673, ¶¶ 35–40.
113. See Rewe Zentralfinanz v. Finanzamt Köln-Mitte, Case C-347/04, [2007] E.C.R.
I-2647, ¶¶ 36, 70; Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v. Keller Holding GmbH, Case C471/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-2107, ¶¶ 34, 50; Commission v. Denmark, Case C-150/04,
[2007] E.C.R. I-1163, ¶¶ 42–77.
114. See, e.g., Manninen v. Finland, Case C-319/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7477, ¶ 55; Lenz
v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Tirol, Case C-315/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-7063, ¶¶ 20–21, 49;
Staatssecretaris van Frinanciën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, Case C-35/98, [2000] E.C.R. I4071, ¶¶ 34–36, 62.
115. See Svensson v. Ministre du Logement et de l’Urbanisme, Case C-484/93,
[1995] E.C.R. I-3955, ¶¶ 5–8.
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national authorities from taxing non-residents and residents
differently.116 For example, tax benefits accorded to resident
companies must also be accorded to permanent establishments
of non-resident companies.117 Similarly, a Member State cannot
impose a higher corporate tax to a foreign company than to
resident companies.118
From the foregoing, it appears that determining whether a
tax system is discriminatory depends to a large extent on the
choice of the comparator.119 Indeed, discrimination will not take
place where, for tax purposes, cross-border and domestic
situations are not objectively comparable. By way of illustration,
this would be so where, with a view to alleviating economic
double taxation, a source state conditions the grant of a tax
credit on the company receiving dividends having income tax
liability.120 In the case of outgoing dividends paid to non-resident
companies not liable to the source state’s income tax, the latter
may not claim access to tax credits related to these dividends. In
those circumstances, denying tax credits to outgoing dividends is
not a discriminatory measure, since resident and non-resident
companies do not find themselves in a comparable situation. The
former are subject to income tax and thus have a right to tax
credits so that the source state does not tax the profits of the
dividend-distributing company first and then the dividends
themselves as income of the receiving company. By contrast,
since non-resident companies do not pay income tax, there is no
risk of economic double taxation imposed by the source state.
Put simply, insofar as the source state is concerned,121 dividends

116. See D.M.M.A. Arens-Sikken v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, Case C-43/07,
[2008] E.C.R. I-6887, ¶ 52.
117. See The Queen v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, ex parte Commerzbank AG, Case
C-330/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-4017, ¶ 13; Commission v. France (Avoir Fiscal), Case 270/83,
[1986] E.C.R. 273, ¶¶ 22, 27–28.
118. See Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, Case C-311/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-2651, ¶
34.
119. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Deutsche Shell GmbH v.
Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen in Hamburg, Case C-293/06, [2007] E.C.R. I-1129, ¶¶
28–30.
120. See Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland
Revenue, Case C-374/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-11,673, ¶¶ 70, 72, 81.
121. The fact that outgoing dividends would be subsequently taxed by the home
state (double taxation) cannot be seen as discrimination either, since this is just an
adverse consequence of having parallel national tax systems. See Opinion of Advocate
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are equally taxed for resident and non-resident companies, that
is, only at the level of the distributing company.122
Furthermore, the ECJ has not adopted a formalistic
approach when qualifying two situations as comparable. In
addition to examining the legal provisions applied to domestic
and cross-border situations, the ECJ also makes a comparative
assessment of the factual context.123 The classic example is
provided by Schumacker.124 There, the ECJ ruled that
discrimination arises where a worker earns most of his income
(ninety percent) in the state of employment, and neither that
state nor the state of residence takes into account his personal
and family circumstances for the purposes of awarding tax
benefits.125 Likewise, not only does discrimination occur where
there is unequal treatment between domestic and cross-border
situations, but it also manifests itself where a Member State
awards preferential treatment to cross-border situations involving
a given Member State.126
It becomes more complex when it is not possible to find an
immediate domestic equivalent to a cross-border situation.
Deutsche Shell127 provides a good example. A German company
sought to deduct the currency loss suffered from the repatriation
of start-up capital previously granted to its permanent
establishment in Italy.128 Given that currency loss is impossible in
domestic situations, it was not deductible under either German

General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig., [2006] E.C.R. I11,673, ¶¶ 83–86.
122. Conversely, discrimination occurs where a home state adopts an exemption
system for domestic dividends and a credit system for foreign dividends, and the first
system affords a more favorable tax treatment than the latter. See Test Claimants in the
FII Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-446/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-11,753,
¶ 57.
123. Michael Lang, Recent Case Law of the ECJ in Direct Taxation: Trends, Tensions,
and Contradictions, 18 EC TAX REV. 98, 101 (2009).
124. See Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I225; Lang, supra note 123, at 101 n.24.
125. See Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. I-225, ¶¶ 47–49.
126. See, e.g., Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Orange European Smallcap Fund
NV, Case C-194/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-3747, ¶¶ 106–08. But see D. v. Inspecteur van
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen, Case C-376/03,
[2005] E.C.R. I-5821, ¶¶ 60–63.
127. Deutsche Shell GmbH v. Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen in Hamburg, Case
C-293/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1129.
128. See id. ¶¶ 9–10.
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or Italian law.129 The question then arose whether the inability to
deduct currency loss ran counter to the treaty provisions on free
movement.130
There are two ways of answering this question. On the one
hand, one may adopt a restriction-based approach whereby nondiscriminatory measures on direct taxation fall within the scope
of these provisions,131 similar to other areas of substantive law.132
However, the adoption of a restriction-based approach runs the
risk of requiring all negative changes in the tax status of free
movers to be submitted to strict scrutiny.133 Arguably, in order
not to substantially diminish the powers retained by the Member
States, the adoption of a restriction-based approach must be
examined with caution.134 On the other hand, one may read the
principle of non-discrimination as requiring not only that
objectively comparable situations are treated equally, but also
that different situations are treated unequally.135 In Deutsche Shell,
the ECJ ultimately endorsed this latter rationale. Since currency
losses may only arise in cross-border situations, a company having
exercised its free movement rights has to face higher economic
risks than domestic companies.136 Consequently, it would be
contrary to the principle of non-discrimination for Member
States to ignore this distinctive feature when awarding tax
deductions or credits. Moreover, Deutsche Shell is not an isolated
case, but it reflects a jurisprudential trend, according to which a

129. See id. ¶¶ 11–21.
130. See id. ¶ 27.
131. This was the approach followed by Advocate General Sharpston. See Opinion
of Advocate General Sharpston, Deutsche Shell, [2008] E.C.R. I-1129, ¶ 34 (arguing that
in this case, trying to find a comparator for currency loss would amount to what in social
law is like finding a comparator for a pregnant woman).
132. See, e.g., Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, Case C-384/93,
[1995] E.C.R. I-1141, ¶¶ 29–31 (services); Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165 (workers).
133. See Kingston, supra note 111, at 1330–31; see also Richard Lyal, Nondiscrimination and Direct Tax in Community Law, 12 EC TAX REV. 68, 74 (2003).
134. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Test Claimants in Class IV of the
ACT Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-374/04, [2006] ECR I-11,673.
135. See Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, Case C-311/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-2651, ¶
26; Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-225, ¶ 30.
136. Deutsche Shell GmbH v. Finanzamt für Groβunternehmen in Hamburg, Case
C-293/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1129, ¶¶ 29–30.
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more elaborate concept of discrimination is preferred to a
restriction-based approach.137
Finally, the case law of the ECJ has not been immune from
criticism. Some scholars argue that as a result of applying the
principle of non-discrimination to both home and source states,
the Court has failed to follow a consistent tax policy.138 Others
posit that the ECJ has engaged in judicial activism by creating
new “taxing rights” and by unduly bending the tax jurisdiction of
the Member States to the benefit of free movers.139 However,
most of the perceived inconsistencies or tensions could easily be
addressed by EU secondary legislation. Given the lack of
consensus among Member States to pass such legislation, the ECJ
is called upon to enforce EU primary law, that is, to strike the
best possible balance between not depriving the Member States
from their taxing powers while making sure that direct taxation
does not become an insurmountable obstacle to market
integration. Of course, even if divergences between the Member
States were to disappear so that legislation could be passed, the
treaty provisions on free movement would still operate to frame
the agreed-upon tax paradigm. This is clearly demonstrated by
the case law involving indirect taxation, where the ECJ’s decisions
complete the system laid down by the EC legislator.140 In the
absence of a legislative consensus on direct taxation
underpinning a certain tax policy, the ECJ has decided not to
examine direct taxation beyond the bounds of discrimination.

137. See, e.g., Belgium v. Truck Ctr. SA, Case C-282/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-10,767; Test
Claimants in the FII Group Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-446/04, [2006]
E.C.R. I-11,753; Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litig., [2006] E.C.R. I-11,673;
Cadbury Schweppes v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, Case C-196/04, [2006] E.C.R. I7995; Conijn v. Hamburg-Nord, Case C-46/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-6137; Ritter-Coulais v.
Germersheim, Case C-152/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1711; Bouanich v. Skatteverket, Case C265/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-923; Mobistar SA v. Commune de Fléron, Joined Cases C-544–
45/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-7723; Blanckaert v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, Case C512/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-7685.
138. See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L. J. 1186, 1219 (2006) (arguing that
prohibiting discrimination based on destination—the home state—is ultimately
inconsistent with prohibiting discrimination based on origin—the source state).
139. See id. at 1201.
140. See Frans Vanistendael, Does the ECJ Have the Power of Interpretation to Build a
Tax System Compatible with the Fundamental Freedoms?, 17 EC TAX REV. 52, 52 (2008)
(inviting the Court to take an analogous approach to that followed for indirect
taxation).
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But market integration driven without any support or guidance
from the legislature is doomed to suffer from shortcomings.141
Far from being a sign of inconsistency, this jurisprudence shows
that the ECJ pays full respect for the competences retained by the
Member States in an area so fundamental to national
sovereignty.142
E.

Health Care: Patient Mobility

Most of the litigation involving patient mobility has dealt
with situations “where a patient goes to another Member State
with the explicit goal of receiving medical care at the expense of
the health care system with which he is insured.”143 Initially,
mobility was confined to the cases provided for by article 22 (1)
of Regulation No. 1408/71144 (now article 20 of Regulation No.
883/2004)145. Adopted on the legal basis of article 48 TFEU
(article 51 EC), this regulation sought to facilitate the
coordination of the social security rights of migrant workers and
their families. The regulation laid down a system of prior
authorization for non-emergency treatment. Article 22(1)(c)
indicates that Member States must grant authorization where the
treatment concerned is provided for by the state of affiliation and
it cannot be given within the time normally necessary for
obtaining it,146 taking into account the patient’s current state of

141. See Damseaux v. Belgium, Case C-128/08, [2009] E.C.R. 6823, ¶ 33;
Kerckhaert v. Belgium, Case C-513/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,967, ¶ 22; see also Koen
Lenaerts & Ludovic Bernardeau, L’encadrement Communautaire de la Fiscalité Directe, 43
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 19 (2007).
142. See Karen Banks, The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax
Measures: Guarding Against Protectionism or Second-Guessing National Policy Choices?, 33
EUR. L. REV. 482, 506 (2008).
143. Koen Lenaerts & Tinne Heremans, Contours of a European Social Union in the
Case-Law of the European Court of Justice, 2 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 101, 108 (2006).
144. See Council Regulation on the Application of Social Security Schemes to
Employed Persons and Their Families Moving Within the Community, No. 1408/71, art.
22(1), 149 J.O. 2 (1971), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. (II) 1971, at 416.
145. See European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Coordination of
Social Security Systems, No. 883/2004, art. 20, 2004 O.J. L 166/1, at 31.
146. Council Regulation No. 1408/71, supra note 144, art. 22(1)(c), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. (II) 1971, at 428. By contrast, article 20 of Regulation No. 883/2004 provides that
the treatment must be provided within a time limit that is “medically justifiable, taking
into account [the patient’s] current state of health and the probable course of his
illness.” European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Coordination of Social
Security Systems, No. 883/2004, art. 20, 2004 O.J. L 166/1, at 31.
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health and probable course of illness. In essence, patients treated
under article 22(1)(c) are covered as if they were insured under
the regime of the host Member State.147 However, given the
limited scope of this provision and the reluctance of Member
States to grant authorizations, free movement of patients was
marginal.148
Patients thus sought to bypass the limitations of article 22 by
relying directly on the treaty provisions on free movement. For
this strategy to succeed, health care services provided in the
context of a social security scheme would have to constitute
economic activities. The ECJ found this to be the case. In
contrast to national education systems149 and to the application
of the treaty provisions on competition,150 the ECJ has
consistently held that for the purpose of free movement, these
services are of an economic nature.151 Accordingly, insofar as
there is a cross-border element, medical service providers,152 as
well as patients, may invoke their free movement rights.
147. See Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes, Case C368/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-5363, ¶ 32. But see Inizan v. Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie
des Hauts-de-Seine, Case C-56/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-12,403, ¶¶ 20–21 (stating that “the
length of the period during which benefits are provided alone [remains] to be governed
by the legislation of the . . . Member State [of affiliation]”).
148. See Anthony Dawes, “Bonjour Herr Doctor:” National Healthcare Systems, the
Internal Market and Cross-border Medical Care within the European Union, 33 LEGAL ISSUES
ECON. INTEGRATION 167, 167 (2006) (arguing that free movement of patients under this
regime was “more of an illusion then [sic] a reality”).
149. See Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365, ¶¶ 17–19. There,
the ECJ indicated three cumulative characteristics that prevented national systems of
public education from having an economic nature. First, there is no agreement on the
price to be paid for the services received; second, the Member States are not driven by
profit making when adopting their policies; and third, public spending primarily
finances these services. Id.
150. Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria v. Commission,
Case C-205/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. I-6295, ¶¶ 8, 25 (holding that activities adopted on the
basis of the principles of universal health coverage and solidarity could not be qualified
as economic).
151. See The Soc’y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, Case
C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 18; Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82
& 26/83, [1984] E.C.R. 377, ¶ 16.
152. This section will not examine national rules that impede health care service
providers from providing services temporarily or permanently in the host Member State.
For cases on this issue see, for example, ; Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes v. Saarland
and Ministerium für Justiz, Gesundheit und Soziales, Joined Cases C-171 & C-172/07,
[2009] E.C.R. I-4171; Commission v. Italy, Case C-531/06, [2009] E.C.R. I-4103; and
Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregierung, Case C-169/07, [2009]
E.C.R. I-1721.
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However, article 168(7) TFEU (article 152(5) EC), states
that “[u]nion action shall respect the responsibilities of the
Member States for the definition of their health policy and for
the organization and delivery of health services and medical
care.”153 This means that Member States are free to opt for a
system based on benefits in kind or reimbursement; that they
enjoy discretion in establishing the entitlements covered by their
social security schemes;154 that they may cap or fix a flat rate of
reimbursement;155 or that national authorities are entitled to
establish a waiting list before a patient can undergo a highly
demanded medical treatment.156
Yet, the margin of maneuver enjoyed by the Member States
in the field of health care cannot render the application of the
treaty provisions on free movement devoid of purpose. As
Advocate General Tesauro so eloquently noted, article 168(7)
TFEU (article 152 EC) “by no means implies that the social
security sector constitutes an island beyond the reach of [EU]
law.”157 Or, in the Court’s own words, although “[EU] law does
not detract from the power of the Member States to organize
their social security systems and to adopt, in particular, provisions
intended to govern the organization of health services . . . in
exercising that power, . . . the Member States must comply with
[EU] law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty on the
freedoms of movement.”158
It follows that it is for the ECJ to strike the right balance
between, on the one hand, ensuring that social security systems
are not obstacles to free movement, and, on the other hand, not
depriving the Member States from all competence in this field.

153. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 168(7), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 123; EC Treaty, supra note
3, art. 152(5), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 115.
154. See B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (Smits & Peerbooms),
Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶¶ 86–87; Duphar BV v. The Netherlands, Case
238/82, [1984] E.C.R. 523, ¶ 17.
155. See Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappig OZ Zorgverzekeringen
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 98.
156. See Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325,
¶ 67.
157. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des
Employés Privés, Case C-120/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 17.
158. Hartlauer v. Wiener, Case C-169/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1721 ¶ 29; see also
Commission v. Germany, Case C-141/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6935, ¶¶ 22–23; Watts, [2006]
E.C.R. I-4325, ¶¶ 92, 146; Duphar, [1984] E.C.R. 523, ¶ 16.
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The application of the EU law framework in the realm of social
security is not an easy task, for two main reasons. Vertically, social
security systems operate on a territorial basis. Their sustainability
lies in the principle that benefits are awarded to those who
contribute to the state treasury. Therefore, exporting social
rights beyond territorial borders would upset the financial
stability that national authorities endeavor to reach in spite of
limited resources and increasing demand. Horizontally, social
security and market integration are governed by different
rationales. Social security is based on a system of cross-subsidies,
whereby some persons contribute more than what they receive
while others receive more than what they contribute. Financial
solidarity is thus the underlying principle of social security
systems, which is at odds with the dynamics governing market
integration and free competition.159 As a result, by welcoming an
alternative system of patient mobility, the ECJ has agreed to
engage in the delicate challenge of delineating the contours of a
“European Social Union.”160
How has the ECJ reconciled individual interests to move
with a fair distribution of limited health care resources? In the
seminal cases Decker161 and Kohll,162 the Court took the first steps
toward framing the capacity of the Member States to organize
and deliver their national health services. Unlike medical
treatment received or medical products bought domestically,
Luxembourg conditioned the reimbursement of the cost for
medical services received or medical products bought in another
Member State upon obtaining a prior authorization. The Court
ruled that this requirement was an obstacle to free movement,163
holding that the system of prior authorization dissuades patients
from purchasing foreign medical goods and from receiving
services abroad. As for Luxembourg’s justification, the ECJ
159. See Christopher Newdick, Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing
Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity, 43 COMMON MKT .L. REV. 1645 (2006)
(arguing that the ECJ should only review national measures pertaining to the
organization and delivery of health care on procedural grounds, otherwise the national
commitment to welfare would be eroded and the credibility of the EU would be
undermined).
160. See Lenaerts & Heremans, supra note 143, at 114–15.
161. Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831.
162. Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931.
163. See Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 36 (free movement of goods); Kohll, [1998]
ECR I-1931, ¶ 35 (freedom to provide services).
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recognized the interest of the Member States in avoiding “the
risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social
security system”164 and in “maintaining a balanced medical and
hospital service opened to all”165 as well as guaranteeing “the
maintenance of a treatment facility or medical service on
national territory.”166 Yet, since the social security system at issue
reimbursed health care expenses at a flat rate, the ECJ found that
there was actually no financial risk.167 Services provided in a
Member State other than Luxembourg would not be more
burdensome than internal provisions of care. As a result, the
Court ruled that the system of prior authorization was contrary to
the treaty.
Decker and Kohll suggest that, in contrast to the regime
introduced by Regulation No. 1408/71 (now Regulation No.
883/2004),168 where patients are treated as though they were
insured in the host Member State, the application of the treaty
provisions on free movement in the realm of health care implies
that patients should be treated as though the treatment were
provided in the Member State of affiliation. This is demonstrated
by the fact that tariffs of reimbursement and entitlements are
defined by the regulations of the Member State of affiliation, so
that the economic implications of patient mobility cannot be
more onerous than domestic provisions of care.169 In addition, it
follows from Decker and Kohll that it is virtually impossible for the
Member States to justify a system of prior authorization for
ambulant health care. To this date, the ECJ has not upheld a
system of prior authorization for non-hospital services. Moreover,
the Court has relied on a quantitative argument to play down the
dramatic consequences of patient mobility for non-hospital
services. In its view, linguistic, geographic, economic, and
cultural barriers would significantly limit the number of crossborder patients seeking ambulant care.170 Finally, Decker and Kohll

164. Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 39; Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, ¶ 41.
165. Kohll, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 50.
166. Id. ¶ 51.
167. See Decker, [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, ¶ 40; Kohll, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 42.
168. See supra notes 144–55 and accompanying text.
169. See Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] ECR I-4509, ¶ 98; Kohll, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 42.
170. See Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶¶ 95–97.
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left unanswered two important questions,171 namely (1) whether
this line of case law also applied to social security systems based
on benefits in kind, and (2) whether a system of prior
authorization for intramural care could be justified.
As for the first question, contrary to the views advanced by
Advocates General Saggio and Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,172 the ECJ
replied in the affirmative. In Smits & Peerbooms, the ECJ ruled
that the treaty provisions on free movement apply regardless of
whether social security systems are based on benefits in kind or
on a reimbursement scheme.173 In order for a medical treatment
to constitute a service, the patients are not required to assume
health care expenses directly. Instead, what matters is for the
medical treatment to be provided for remuneration, that is, as
consideration for the service in question.174 In Müller-Fauré,175 the
Court added that, just as in social security systems based on
reimbursement, patients insured under a social security system
based on benefits in kind who travel to another Member State
with a view to receiving medical treatment first have to pay the
doctors providing the medical services and then request the
refund of the expenses from the Member State in which they are
insured.176 From this perspective, not only does the difference
between the two types of social security systems disappear, but
also the economic nature of the medical services provided
becomes self-evident.177
As for the second question, the ECJ has held that intramural
care is not an exception to the application of the free movement
principle.178 In effect, “the application of any national rules
which have the effect of making the provision of services between
171. See BARNARD, supra note 30, at 365.
172. See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v.
Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (Smits & Peerbooms), Case C-157/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473;
Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des Mutualités
Chrétiennes, Case C-368/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-5363.
173. See Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473.
174. See id. ¶ 58
175. See Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509.
176. See id. ¶ 39.
177. See Vassilis G. Hatzopoulos, Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but
Healing Patients? The European Market for Health Care Services After the Judgments of the ECJ
in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 683, 692–93 (2002) (opining
that the ECJ relied on an “atypical” situation to find the economic nature of health care
services).
178. See Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 53.
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Member States more difficult than the provision of services
purely within a Member State”179 needs to be justified. However,
this does not mean that the ECJ obviates the possibility that
patient mobility involving intramural care may threaten the
financial balance of social security systems and run the risk of
disturbing health care planning. In Smits & Peerbooms, MüllerFauré, and more recently in Watts, the ECJ acknowledged that a
system of prior authorization for intramural care may be justified.
Since intramural care requires Member States to plan “the
number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the mode of
their organization and the equipment with which they are
provided, and even the nature of the medical services which they
are able to offer,”180 to guarantee “sufficient and permanent
access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment”181
on the national territory, and “to control costs and to prevent, as
far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and human
resources,”182 the ECJ has ruled that a system of prior
authorization is “both necessary and reasonable.”183 However, a
system of prior authorization may only comply with the principle
of proportionality insofar as a series of substantive and
procedural conditions are fulfilled. In relation to the former
conditions, although the Member State of affiliation may refuse
to authorize an experimental or unconventional treatment, its
decision must be based on up-to-date international scientific
information.184 Additionally, unless the Member State of
affiliation provides an equally effective treatment without undue
delay, an authorization must be granted. When evaluating
whether a treatment can be given without undue delay, the
competent national authorities must examine, on a case-by-case
179. Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶
94; see also Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 61; Kohll v. Union des Caisses de
Maladie, Case C-158/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, ¶ 33.
180. Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 76; see also Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I4325, ¶ 108; Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 77.
181. Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 109; Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶
78; see also Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 79.
182. Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 109; Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 80;
Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 79.
183. See Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 110; Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 81;
Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 80.
184. See Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 94.
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basis, the medical condition and history of the patient, the level
of pain suffered by him, and how the nature of his disability
could adversely affect his professional activities.185 As for the
procedural conditions,186 the system of prior authorization must
be accessible to patients. Decisions of the competent authority
must be based on objective, predetermined, and nondiscriminatory criteria. Finally, decisions must be taken within a
reasonable time and subject to judicial or quasi-judicial review.
Furthermore, with a view to curtailing the degree of
discretion enjoyed by the Member States under article 22(1) of
Regulation No. 1408/71, the ECJ has decided to partially
extrapolate its case law under article 56 TFEU (article 49 EC).187
As mentioned above, under this provision, the competent
Member State may not refuse to issue an authorization if medical
treatment cannot be given within “the time normally necessary”
for obtaining it.188 In Inizan,189 the ECJ was called upon to clarify
how “normally necessary” must be interpreted. Quoting Smits &
Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré, the ECJ ruled that “normally
necessary” must be read mutatis mutandis as the Court interprets
“without undue delay” under article 56 TFEU (article 49 EC).190
In the same way, the ECJ also held that article 22 (1) is subject to
the same procedural conditions as those introduced under this
treaty provision.191 However, in spite of this partial alignment,
important differences between the two systems of cross-border
health care persist, especially with regard to the level of
reimbursement of costs,192 traveling costs, and accommodation
expenses.193

185. See Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 90; Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I5473, ¶ 104.
186. See Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 116; Müller-Fauré, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, ¶ 85;
Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] E.C.R. I-5473, ¶ 90.
187. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 56, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 70; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
49, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 34–35.
188. See Watts, [2006] E.C.R. I-4325, ¶ 2.
189. Inizan v. Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie des Hauts-de-Seine, Case C56/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-12,403.
190. See id. ¶¶ 44–46.
191. See id. ¶ 48.
192. For patient mobility directly based on the treaty, the level of reimbursement
may be limited to the cost of equivalent treatment in the Member State of affiliation. By
contrast, under the regulation, health care will be covered as if the cross-border patient
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In summary, the case law on patient mobility demonstrates
that the ECJ has not tilted the balance in favor of either market
integration or social security. On the one hand, by drawing the
distinction between hospital and non-hospital services,194 the ECJ
makes sure that the overriding reasons of general interest put
forward by the Member States are significant and real. On the
other hand, while recognizing that a system of prior
authorization for hospital care is “both necessary and
reasonable” in order to optimize the allocation of limited
financial, logistical and professional resources, the ECJ also
makes sure that Member States do not exercise this power
arbitrarily. Member States must adduce the medical reasons
based on international, objective, and scientific criteria. They
must also adopt their decision in accordance with a process that
safeguards patients’ right to move. Most importantly, the
principle of proportionality reminds the Member States that
before making a decision, the latter must take into account the
right of patients to move freely within the EU.
II. FRAMING THE PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE MEMBER
STATES
The application of EU law is decentralized.195 It is for the
national courts, as juges de l’Union, to enforce EU rights. There is
thus a division of tasks between the two levels of governance: EU
law provides the right, while national rules of procedure provide
the remedy.196 This distribution of power, embodied in the
was insured under the regime of the host Member State. See Acereda Herrera v. Servicio
Cántabro de Salud, Case C-466/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-5341, ¶ 1.
193. While these types of costs are not covered under the regulation, they are for
cross-border patients relying directly on the treaty, provided that the Member State of
affiliation covers these costs for patients moving internally (for example, from a city to
another city of the same Member State). Compare Leichtle v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit,
Case C-8/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-2641 with Acereda Herrera, [2006] E.C.R. I-5341.
194. Nevertheless, this distinction may be difficult to apply. For example, is this
distinction governed by the type of medical treatment or the place where it takes place?
See Elies Steyger, National Health Care Systems Under Fire (but not too heavily), 29 LEGAL
ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 97, 105 (2002).
195. See generally KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2006); TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 418–23; MICHAEL
DOUGAN, NATIONAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE (2004).
196. See Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Kühne v. Productschap voor
Pluimvee en Eieren, Case C-453/00, [2004] E.C.R. I-837, ¶ 18; see also Walter Van
Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV.. 501, 502 (2000).
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principle of procedural autonomy, requires the Member States to
organize the administration of justice. To enforce their EU
rights, applicants must thus look at national law for rules on
limitation periods, compensation, unjust enrichment, standing
before national courts, the effects of final administrative
decisions, and so forth.
Yet, in the absence of harmonization, EU rights would be
seriously weakened if their enforcement were at the Member
States’ absolute mercy. The principles of primacy and direct
effect would be reduced to programmatic postulates. That is why,
paraphrasing the U.S. Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron, primacy
and direct effect must “make constitutional ideas into living
truths,”197 that is, EU rights must be accompanied by effective
remedies.198
Therefore, an underlying tension exists between, on the one
hand, the principles of primacy and direct effect and, on the
other hand, the principle of national procedural autonomy.
Extreme solutions are barred. There is neither a
communitarization of all rules of procedure, nor are the rules
merely left alone when they adversely affect the effectiveness of
EU rights. Instead, when two constitutional principles point at
diverging directions, balancing emerges as the adequate solution.
To this effect, the ECJ has conditioned the lawfulness of national
rules of procedure upon compliance with two principles, namely
the principle of equivalence and the principle of effectiveness.
While the first principle is no less than the extrapolation of
the general principle of non-discrimination to the law of
remedies,199 the second requires that the enforcement of EU
197. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958); see also TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at
422.
198. This principle is now codified in article 19 TEU post-Lisbon which provides
that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal
protection in the fields covered by Union law.” TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 19,
2010 O.J. C 83, at 27.
199. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Impact v. Minister for Agric. & Food,
Case C-268/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2483, ¶ 67. The ECJ has ruled that claims based on EU
law must not be treated less favorably than claims based on national law. In order to
apply this principle, “the purpose and cause of action” of both claims must be similar.
Levez v. Jennings Ltd. (Harlow Pools), Case C-326/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-7835, ¶ 41. The
principle of equivalence includes both direct and indirect discrimination. See Preston v.
Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust v. Midland Bank plc, Case C-78/98, [2000]
E.C.R. I-3201, ¶ 51; Harlow Pools, [1998] E.C.R. I-7835, ¶¶ 46–47; see also Transportes
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rights at the national level must not be “virtually impossible or
excessively difficult,” that is, national rules of procedure must
ensure a basic threshold of judicial protection.200 Thus, these two
principles operate as a framework limiting the procedural
autonomy of the Member States.
There are three phases that can be distinguished in the case
law as to the application of this framework.201 First, from the
beginning until the mid-1980s, the ECJ took a very conservative
approach. National remedies were the rule, and EU law “was not
intended to create new remedies.”202 By contrast, from the mid1980s to the early 1990s, the ECJ adopted a very active stand. It
was posited that the ECJ had embarked on the harmonization of
the law of remedies.203 A look at cases such as Francovich204 and
Brasserie205 reveals that these assertions were not entirely
misguided. In fact, this situation led some scholars to argue that
the ECJ often tilted the balance in favor of EU law,206 accusing it
of not being an impartial umpire. Today, these criticisms may still
echo in the mind of some commentators207 when reading cases
such as Köbler,208 Khüne,209 or Muñoz.210
A close look at recent cases, however, shows a different
picture. Having laid down the foundations of the EU remedial
edifice, the ECJ has moved onto a new paradigm. Currently, it is
Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v. Administración del Estado, Case C-118/08, [2010]
E.C.R. __, [2010] 2 C.M.L.R. 1053, 1074.
200. See Van der Weerd v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit,
Joined Cases C-222 & C-225/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-4233, ¶ 17.
201. See TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 420–22; DOUGAN, supra note 195, at 28–34.
202. Rewe Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, Case 158/80,
[1981] E.C.R. 1805, ¶ 44.
203. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 268
(2006) (arguing that “[i]n the second phase, the [ECJ] adopted a much more
interventionist stance in which greater emphasis was given to the need to ensure the
effective protection of [Union] rights”).
204. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357.
205. Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined Cases C-46 &
C-48/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-1029.
206. See Mark Hoskins, Tilting the Balance: Supremacy and National Procedural Rules,
21 EUR. L. REV. 365, 367 (1996).
207. See Peter J. Wattel, Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go on Meeting Like
This, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 177, 190 (2004)
208. Köbler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10,239.
209. Kühne v. Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, Case C-453/00, [2004]
E.C.R. I-837.
210. Muñoz y Cia SA v. Frumar Ltd., Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-7289.
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less assertive, and its approach towards the law of remedies has
become more nuanced. The Court follows an “objective
justification model”211 or “selective deference,”212 whereby some
cases are left to the national courts to decide, while the ECJ takes
a more proactive attitude in others. One could also suggest that
in cooperation with national courts, the ECJ strives to protect the
interests embodied in the national rules of procedure while
maintaining a sufficient level of judicial protection of EU
rights.213 At this time, it cannot be argued that the ECJ does not
pay attention to the principle of procedural autonomy. On the
contrary, by taking into account the procedural principles
enshrined in national law, such as legal certainty, the right of
defense, the fair conduct of litigation, or procedural economy,
the ECJ and national courts work hand in hand to improve the
quality of enforcement of EU rights.
A. Respecting National Standing Doctrines
In states with common-law traditions, applicants are often
allowed to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against possible
acts of public authorities. There is generally no need for the
applicants to obtain an administrative act before they can
challenge the legislation on which the act is based. For instance,
in the United Kingdom, the problem that gave rise to the
discussion in UPA214 and later in Jégo-Quéré215 would not have
arisen. Applicants in the United Kingdom can even bring
proceedings against the intention of the legislator to implement
a directive.216 Likewise, in light of the principle of equivalence,
applicants in the United Kingdom enjoy a declaratory-type action
211. DOUGAN, supra note 195, at 30.
212. TRIDIMAS, supra note 14, at 418–22.
213. See Andrea Biondi, How to Go Ahead as an EU Law National Judge, 15 EUR. PUB.
L. 225, 238 (2009) (noting that “the relationship between the ECJ and the national
courts is pretty healthy, with both sets of courts striving to provide efficient remedies to
guarantee the rights of the citizens”).
214. Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council (UPA), Case C-50/00P, [2002]
E.C.R. I-6677, ¶¶ 7–8, 61.
215. Commission v. Jégo-Quéré, Case C-263/02P, [2004] E.C.R. I-3425, ¶ 1.
216. See Int’l Assoc. of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Sec’y of State for Transport, Case
C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-4057; The Queen, ex rel. Alliance for Natural Health v. Sec’y
of State for Health, Joined Cases C-154 & C-155/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-6451, ¶¶ 49–51; The
Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments)
Ltd., Case C-491/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-11,453.
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to challenge national laws conflicting with EU law. By contrast, in
civil-law states, direct and free-standing challenges against
legislation are seen as unduly intruding upon the proper
functioning of political institutions.217 Applicants wishing to
contest the lawfulness of legislative measures must seek indirect
challenges, such as an action for damages or raise a plea of
illegality against such measures when seeking the annulment of
the administrative act based on them. It follows that in states
governed by common-law traditions, applicants have easier access
to direct legal remedies.
Does this mean that Member States banning free-standing
declaratory-type actions are in breach of the principle of
effectiveness? Far from being trivial, this question strikes at the
epicenter of constitutional justice. Defining when and how
applicants may challenge legislative measures has important
repercussions not only for applicants’ rights, but also for the
principle of separation of powers. Granting an open access to
courts would result in a critique of the judiciary for intruding in
the political process.218 In 2007, the ECJ answered this question
in the negative in Unibet.219 That would be otherwise “only if it
were apparent from the overall scheme of the national legal
system in question that no legal remedy existed which made it
possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individual’s
rights under [EU] law.”220 Consequently, the principle of
effectiveness is neutral vis-à-vis direct and indirect legal remedies.
Nonetheless, where applicants are forced to face criminal
penalties or administrative sanctions in order to avail themselves
of the only possible indirect remedy, the ECJ considers that this
principle is being infringed.221
It follows that the Member States are free to decide how
national legislative measures conflicting with EU law may be
challenged, provided that a minimum threshold of judicial
protection is attained, it being understood that a remedy which

217. See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review and Why It
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2744 & n.2 (2003).
218. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882–83 (1983).
219. Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-2271.
220. Id. ¶ 41.
221. See id. ¶ 64.
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consists of “testing the lawfulness of the law by breaking it”222 is
not an effective one. In so doing, the ECJ duly takes into account
cultural traditions as well as ethical values that underpin national
rules of procedure.
B.

Simplification of the Legal Process

An interesting question for national legislators is whether
they can create specialized courts whose jurisdiction is limited to
enforcing particular national laws. In other words, claims having
the same form of action but directly based on EU law would be
excluded from the purview of these specialized courts, and
directed to ordinary courts. Additionally, actions partly based on
national law and partly based on EU law would have to be split in
order to have access to these specialized courts.
In essence, this was the issue which the ECJ confronted in
Impact, decided in 2008.223 There, the ECJ held that, insofar as
dividing the action into two separate complaints would result in
procedural disadvantages for individuals seeking to rely directly
on EU law, the principle of effectiveness mandates specialized
courts to expand their jurisdiction accordingly.224 This would be
the case where the costs, the duration, and rules of
222. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Unibet, [2007] E.C.R. I-2271, ¶ 44
(echoing the argument previously advanced by Advocate General Jacobs in UPA, Case C50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶ 43, in the context of the judicial review of community
measures). In UPA, Advocate General Jacobs criticized the case law of the ECJ under exarticle 230 EC on the ground that Community regulations not requiring further
national implementing measures would force applicants not having standing to breach
Community law, exposing them to administrative sanctions, which they could then
challenge. Advocate General Jacobs, consequently, urged the ECJ to adopt a more
generous approach in defining “individual concern.” Opinion of Advocate General
Jacobs, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council (UPA), [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶ 59.
Yet, the ECJ persisted in not departing from its previous case law, holding that this
would require a treaty amendment, and noted that, in any event, it is for the national
legislators to facilitate indirect challenges. See UPA, [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶¶ 40–41. But
see TFEU, supra note 3, art. 263, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 162–63; EC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
230, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 146 (no longer requiring applicants to be “individually
concerned” in relation to “[EU] regulatory act[s] which [are] of direct concern to them
and [do] not entail implementing measures”). Arguably, in the light of Unibet, it seems
that the ECJ is more demanding with national courts than it is with itself. See Anthony
Arnull, Note on Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd. and Unibet (International) Ltd. v.
Justitiekanslern, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1763, 1776 (2007)
223. Impact v. Minister for Agric. & Food, Case C-268/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2483, ¶
37.
224. Id. ¶ 55.
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representation rendered the exercise of EU rights excessively
difficult.225 The ECJ did not decide whether the applicant was put
in a disadvantaged position. This determination was left to the
national court.226
One could object that the Court intruded into the realm of
national rules of procedure, since the applicant could have filed
its complaint before an ordinary court in the first place.
However, this argument is difficult to uphold in light of two
procedural principles. First, as indicated by Advocate General
Kokott,227 the allocation of certain claims to specialized courts
ensures the efficient administration of justice. In light of their
legal expertise, specialized courts are better equipped to provide
parties with a faster and more accurate legal solution to the
question brought before them than an ordinary court.228
Secondly, the ruling of the ECJ is consistent with the principle of
procedural economy. It aims to prevent applicants invoking EU
rights from facing procedural complications and thus improves
the procedural system as a whole. Not only would parallel
litigation increase the costs of the applicant, but also those of the
defendant. National courts would also waste precious time and
resources by examining the same legal issues twice. Seen from
this perspective, the ECJ and the referring national court
cooperated in pursuing the same goal, namely ensuring the
quality and speed of the administration of justice.
C. Endorsing General Procedural Principles of National Law
EU law does not require national courts to “abandon the
passive role assigned to them in civil proceedings by going
beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties
themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than
225. See id. ¶ 51.
226. Id. ¶ 54. However, Advocate General Kokott went a step further, holding that
the specialized court should exercise its jurisdiction over the claim directly based on EU
law. She opined that any separation of jurisdiction would render a direct reliance on EU
rights excessively difficult, weakening its direct effect. See Opinion of Advocate General
Kokott, Impact, [2008] E.C.R. I-2483, ¶ 65. As for the principle of equivalence, she drew
a comparison between actions filed before ordinary courts and actions lodged before
specialized courts, concluding that the former were considerably more formal, complex,
costly, and time-consuming than the latter. Id. Accordingly, applicants directly invoking
EU law were in a worse position than those relying on national law. Id. ¶ 76.
227. Id. ¶ 55.
228. See Biondi, supra note 213, at 230.
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those on which the party with an interest in application of [EU
law] bases his claim.”229 Otherwise, the right of defense and the
proper conduct of proceedings may be jeopardized. Yet, national
courts must raise a point of EU law of their own motion when
national law requires or authorizes them to do so,230 particularly
when that point of EU law concerns public policy.231 In relation
to consumer protection, EU law vests in national courts the
procedural power to examine the unfair character of a
jurisdictional clause or of any other contractual term of their own
motion.232
In Heemskerk233 delivered in 2008, a Dutch court asked the
ECJ whether a national court should invoke EU law of its own
motion in order to redress a violation of EU law, despite the fact
that this would contravene the principle of Dutch law prohibiting
reformatio in pejus by putting the individual bringing the action in
a less favorable position than if he had not brought that action in
the first place.
Advocate General Bot answered this question in the
affirmative. He pointed out that the principle of effectiveness,
understood as the effective exercise of rights conferred by EU
law, was not an appropriate reference for the case at issue.234
Since no party would raise a plea contrary to its own interests and
no administrative authority would be enthusiastic to admit it
made a mistake, he urged the ECJ not to look at the “private
interests of individuals,” but to examine whether the general
interest at the EU level (the financial interests of the EU as well
as animal welfare) was safeguarded.235 To this effect, the
Advocate General considered that, as “the last line of defence for

229. Van Schijndel v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases
C-430–31/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-4705, ¶ 22.
230. See id. ¶ 14.
231. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999]
E.C.R. I-3055.
232. See Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL, Case C-168/05, [2006] E.C.R.
I-10,421; Cofidis v. Jean-Louis Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-10,875; Océano
Grupo Editorial v. Murciano Quintero, Joined Cases C-240 & C-244/98, [2000] E.C.R. I4941. For a more recent case, see Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, Case C243/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-4713.
233. Heemskerk BV & Firma Schaap v. Productschap Vee en Vlees, Case C-455/06,
[2008] E.C.R. I-8763.
234. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Heemskerk, [2008] E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 122.
235. Id. ¶ 127.
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correcting a misapplication of [EU] law by a competent national
authority,”236 the referring court should mandate of its own
motion the recovery of all sums already paid, even if this entails
setting aside the principle of Dutch law prohibiting reformatio in
pejus.
The ECJ, however, took a different approach. It held that
EU law does not require national courts to violate the
prohibition of reformatio in pejus contained in national law. In its
view, “[s]uch an obligation would be contrary not only to the
principles of respect for the rights of the defence, legal certainty
and protection of legitimate expectations . . . ,” but it would also
put the applicant “in a less favorable position than he would have
been in, had he not brought that action.”237
Heemskerk thus demonstrates the ECJ’s serious commitment
to respecting the principles enshrined in national rules of
procedure. While the approach defended by the Advocate
General would have encouraged national authorities to be more
rigorous when exercising their discretion and would have
prevented recipients from retaining unlawfully obtained funds,238
the ECJ reckoned that these concerns were not pressing enough
to depart from the principle of Dutch law prohibiting reformatio
in pejus. The Court prioritizes the defense of the procedural
rights of the parties over endorsing à tout prix effectiveness of the
judicial enforcement of the general interest at EU level. This case
also indicates that the ECJ is not so keen on limiting the
principle of procedural autonomy where the applicant’s EU
rights are not at risk.
D. Preserving the Division of Jurisdiction between the ECJ and
National Courts
The principle of res judicata aims at reinforcing legal
certainty by establishing that judicial proceedings at some stage
become final. Not only has this principle been recognized by the
ECJ in relation to judicial review of EU acts,239 but also as to
236. Id. ¶¶ 128–29.
237. Heemskerk, [2008] E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 47.
238. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Heemskerk, [2008] E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 144.
239. See Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal
& Steel Cmty., Case 3/54, [1955] E.C.R., 63; Italy v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal & Steel
Cmty., Case 2/54, [1954] E.C.R. 37, ¶ 55; France v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal & Steel
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national judicial proceedings involving EU law.240 However, as
recognized by the national systems themselves241 and by the
European Court of Human Rights,242 this principle is not
absolute. For instance, where a judicial decision blatantly violates
fundamental rights, its final character cannot be upheld. By the
same token, the principle of res judicata should not stand in the
way of principles vital for the EU, such as the principle of
primacy or conferred competence. Thus, in Lucchini,243 the ECJ
was asked whether a Commission decision, declaring that state
aid granted to an Italian company was unlawful, had to be given
effect by Italian authorities despite a final decision of an Italian
civil court to the contrary. Not having brought annulment
proceedings against the Commission decision, the recipient of
the aid sought to rely on the principle of res judicata in order to
avoid recovery. In a succinct judgment, the ECJ held that EU law
required national courts to comply with the Commission
decision, even if this meant “refusing . . . to apply any conflicting
provision of national legislation.”244
The ruling of the ECJ in Lucchini has been criticized on the
ground that it erodes the res judicata principle. Critics argued
that regardless of whether one agrees or not with the argument
that state liability for acts of the judiciary undermines the
principle of res judicata, Köbler at least did not adversely affect the
rights of private parties, whereas in Lucchini, the recipient of the
aid was forced to reimburse it more than twelve years after the
flawed judicial decision became final.245 The right avenue would

Cmty., Case 1/54, [1954] E.C.R. 1, 17; see also P & O European Ferries v. Commission,
Joined Cases C-442 & C-471/03P, [2006] E.C.R. I-4845, ¶ 43; Commission v. AssiDomän
Kraft Products, Case C-310/97P, [1999] E.C.R. I-5363, ¶ 54.
240. See Kapferer v. Schlank & Schick GmbH, Case C-234/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-2585,
¶¶ 20–21; Kühne v. Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, Case C-453/00, [2004]
E.C.R. I-837, ¶ 23, 28; Köbler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10,239, ¶¶ 38–
39; Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999] E.C.R. I3055, ¶¶ 46–47.
241. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Ministero dell’Industria, del
Commercio e dell’Artigianato v. Lucchini SpA, Case C-119/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-6199, ¶
37.
242. See S.A. Dangeville v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 71.
243. Lucchini, [2007] E.C.R. I-6199, ¶ 48.
244. Id. ¶ 61.
245. See Petr Briza, Lucchini SpA—Is There Anything Left of Res Judicata Principle?, 27
CIV. JUST. Q. 40, 44 (2008).
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rather have been for the Commission to initiate infringement
proceedings against Italy.246
However, these arguments seem to play down the crux of
the ECJ’s rationale. In addition to being a clear violation of EU
law, the flawed judicial decision threatened the vertical allocation
of powers between the EU and the Member States. In contrast to
previous cases where the principle of res judicata was discussed,
Lucchini involved the encroachment by a national court on an
exclusive competence of the EU.247 Not only did the Italian court
misinterpret the obligations EU law imposes on it, but it also
exceeded its jurisdiction. Such upfront attack on the principle of
primacy could not be tolerated, even if cloaked in the principle
of national procedural autonomy.
Indeed, no one will contest that the principle of primacy
would be reduced to nothing if the principle of res judicata
prevented a final decision issued by a national court, which
declares void an EU act, from being set aside.248 The same
constitutional damage is suffered by the EU legal order when a
national court strips the Commission of its exclusive competence
to declare state aid incompatible with the common market.
Therefore, in order to protect the constitutional equilibrium, the
ECJ had no other option but to intervene.
Finally, suppose that the Commission decision had been
unsuccessfully challenged by the recipient and that no appeal
had been brought against the ruling of the EGC. There would
then be two conflicting rulings, both final. Using a temporal
criterion to award preclusive effect does not seem appropriate,
especially if the earlier ruling is issued by a national court that
lacks jurisdiction. Far from undermining the principle of res
judicata, the ECJ is simply relying on the principle of primacy to
avoid parallel EU and national litigation leading to jurisdictional
conflicts. Thus, in Lucchini, the ECJ did not forever turn its back
on the principle of res judicata. On the contrary, in so far as
national courts operate within their jurisdiction, due account
must be taken of this principle.
246. See id. at 49.
247. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Lucchini, [2007] E.C.R. I-6199, ¶
47.
248. See Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost., Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199,
¶ 20 (holding that the EU judiciary enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to declare void an EU
act held to be illegal).
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CONCLUSION
There are no enclaves of national sovereignty precluding EU
law from displaying its pervasive effects. Instead, provided that
there is a link with the substantive law of the Union, there is an
EU framework that percolates through all areas of national law,
limiting the discretion of national legislators and administrative
authorities. Consequently, the latter must foresee possible links
with EU law and draft national measures accordingly
(alternatively, they may also decide to limit the application of a
given measure to purely internal situations).
Ultimately, it is therefore the existence (or absence) of this
link that is decisive in the vertical allocation of powers. The area
of law within which the conflict between national law and EU law
arises does not really matter in this respect. As a corollary of this
link, EU law leaves unaddressed reverse discrimination. For
example, a German couple who has always resided in Germany
may not use a double-barreled surname when naming their child.
Traditionally, these situations are left to the national political
process to tackle or are redirected to the judicial process where
they would have to pass muster under the relevant national
constitutional provisions. For example, it would be for the
German legislator or for the German courts applying the
German constitution to put an end to reverse discrimination.
Furthermore, since Member States may justify restrictions
prohibited in principle by the treaty provisions on free
movement and EU citizenship by referring to reasons of general
interest (as recognized by the EU), the degree of scrutiny
employed by the ECJ in assessing their validity is also crucial in
defining how much power is left to the Member States.
In the absence of harmonization, pursuant to the principles
of equivalence and effectiveness, it is for national procedural
rules to afford a sufficient level of judicial protection to EU
rights. Recent case law demonstrates that the ECJ and national
courts cooperate to improve the quality of litigation while not
neglecting the protection of EU rights. In sum, the ECJ takes into
account the principles enshrined in national rules of procedure.
Finally, far from being immutable, the EU framework has
shifting contours, and the pervasive effect of EU law must be
assessed on a case by case basis. This is not surprising. As shown
by the examples taken from the case law of the ECJ, the
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application of the treaty provisions on free movement and EU
citizenship as well as the application of the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness often involve balancing colliding
interests of equal constitutional ranking. The ECJ must perform
this challenging task in a constructive dialogue with national
courts.

